GREAT BRITAIN 
 The Origins of Britain's Appeasement Policy. 
 Britain's appeasement policy was adopted many years before the Nazi rise to power. It was a result of the peace agreements at the end of World War I, whose harsh terms aroused misgivings among the British and Americans. Appeasement toward Germany was also sustained by the traditional national interests of Britain in maintaining peace through commerce. With the Nazi rise to power, and as the strength of Germany increased, Britain increasingly sought to attain relief in the international arena through accords with Germany. Up to 1937, Britain followed a policy of passive appeasement, accepting German moves as faits accomplis. In May 1937, Chamberlain initiated a policy of active appeasement, advocating negotiations with Germany on the modifications of the post war treaties necessary to remove the German threat. With the Anschluss, the West confined itself to protests. With the impending threat on Czechoslovakia, which could lead to war with its allies France and the Soviet Union, Chamberlain took preventive steps to avoid a German attack. This resulted in the Munich Conference and agreement. 
 
 Negotiations with Hitler 
 At the time, the attempt to appease Germany by putting pressure on an independent state was not seen in Britain as a base or treacherous act, but as a bold step to save Europe from war. During the negotiations, Hitler introduced new demands, in addition to the return of the Sudetenland, which raised questions in Britain as to the morality or desirability of such an agreement. After its signing, Alfred Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, resigned from the government, and Winston Churchill harshly criticised the agreement. When Hitler violated his pledges and occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, all were convinced that the policy of appeasement had failed. Chamberlain was obliged to change his policy and give guarantees of support to Poland and Romania. Yet, even after the German invasion of Poland, he only reluctantly declared war. There are two major arguments presented for diminishing the personal culpability of Chamberlain: One stresses that Britain, with responsibilities outside of Europe, refused to accept commitments in a region where it had no interests and that might lead to war. This was especially so since Britain had no land army and, at a time of economic crisis, unemployment, and pacifism, British industry was just beginning to recover and refused to finance a transformation to war production. A second explanation stresses the general changes in Britain's political culture as the empire began to decline and society experienced the rise of new social forces, some socialist, some pacifist, and some enthusiastically supporting the League of Nations as an alternative to international armed struggle. The reaction against pre-World War I jingoism aroused self-doubt and self-criticism, and tolerance even toward despotic regimes. British intellectuals, especially the Left, wished to rid themselves of narrow British considerations, and understand the desires of other peoples, especially the Germans.